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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT THE FIRST
TIME: ADDRESSING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the Supreme Court formally recognized a “ministerial exception” preventing Title VII discrimination claims against religious
employers by their “ministers.”1 However, the Supreme Court left
many questions unanswered regarding the “ministerial exception,” especially how it applies to workplace harassment.2 Thus far, three appellate courts have opined differently on the ministerial exception’s
applicability to workplace harassment claims, setting up an inevitable
Supreme Court decision to address the current split in authority.3 This
Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning in the
Seventh Circuit’s vacated, original judgment in Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish.4
Part II of this Note provides a background of the ministerial exception and how it has been interpreted by various circuit courts.5 Part III
analyzes these appellate court decisions, arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s original decision in Demkovich should be followed because it
employs the clearest line of reasoning and, therefore, should be controlling precedent moving forward.6
Part IV examines the detrimental impact of expanding the ministerial exception to workplace harassment claims.7 This Part further suggests that the Supreme Court should adopt the analysis the Seventh
Circuit originally provided in Demkovich before the Seventh Circuit
reversed its decision.8
1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
2. Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for Pregnancy Discrimination
Claims and Employees’ Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J. OF CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 47, 58–59
(2013).
3. See infra Part II.
4. From here on, the Seventh Circuit’s vacated judgment will be referred to as the original
Demkovich decision.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
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MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

This Part provides background on the constitutional and statutory
foundations of the ministerial exception and the Supreme Court decisions delineating its scope. Next, this Part discusses the circuit court
decisions leading to the current split in authority over the ministerial
exception’s applicability to workplace harassment claims.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”9 Since the drafting of the Constitution, scholars have debated the intended scope of the First Amendment.10 How much interference by the government is permissible? Is the government allowed
to interfere at all?
The First Amendment is divided into two clauses: the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause.11 The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from regulating people’s religious beliefs, allowing Americans the freedom to accept and practice whatever beliefs
they choose.12 The Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from establishing an official religion in the United States.13 The full
extent of what establishing a religion means is unclear.14 While many
cases involving religion and the First Amendment only implicate one
of the Religion Clauses, the ministerial exception is unique in that it
deals with both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause.15
B. Title VII and Existing Workplace Harassment Remedies
In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.16 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) pre9. U.S. Const. amend. I.
10. Stephen J. Wermiel, The Ongoing Challenge to Define Free Speech, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2021).
11. First Amendment and Religion, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/first-amendment-and-religion (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
12. Free Exercise Clause, LEGAL INFORMATION INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
free_exercise_clause (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
13. First Amendment and Religion, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n., 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
16. Timeline of Important EEOC events, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/youth/timeline-important-eeoc-events (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
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vents employers from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” when making employment decisions.17
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
states that harassment is a form of workplace discrimination that violates Title VII.18 The EEOC defines harassment as “unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, religion, sex . . . national origin, age
. . . disability, or genetic information.”19 Once the harassment reaches
a level that creates a hostile work environment, the harassment becomes unlawful.20 Slight annoyances do not constitute illegal conduct.21 On its website, the EEOC lists examples of misconduct that
rise to the level of illegal conduct such as offensive jokes, slurs, name
calling, ridicule, and put-downs, amongst other forms of harassment.22
Under Title VII, employers are liable for harassment if it is conducted by a supervisor and results in an employee’s termination, failure of promotion, loss of wages, or other similar repercussions.23
Employers are also liable for harassment by any other employee if the
employer knew about the harassment and failed to take action.24
However, the options for relief under a Title VII claim are minimal.25
Different intentional tort theories are used when trying to obtain relief by someone who was harassed in the workplace.26 Equitable relief
such as injunctions and the payment or reduction of backpay are some
of the few remedies that a harassed employee has under Title VII.27 In
contrast, compensatory or punitive damages are not permitted forms
of relief under Title VII.28
Due to their special status under the Religion Clauses, religious organizations have been able to escape many of Title VII’s comprehen17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2019).
18. Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment
(last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Harassment, supra note 18.
25. See Sharon T. Bradford, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination: Restoring
Title VII’s Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615 (1990).
26. See generally David Yamada, Workplace Bullying and the Law: A Report from the United
States, in JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING REPORT NO. 12, 165 (2013); see also Bradford, supra note 25, at 1618–20 (Specifically, in cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace, the theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and others
are used. However, the standard to recover is hard to overcome in these cases.).
27. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https:/
/www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964 (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
28. Bradford, supra note 25, at 1620.
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sive employee protections. Under Title VII, religious organizations
are “permitted to give preference to members of their own religion”;
this is known as the “Religious Organization Exception.”29 “[C]ourts
have struggled with the question of how to treat disputes involving
religious institutions,” leading to the current split in authority regarding the “ministerial exception.”30
C. The Birth of the Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception is a legal doctrine that “allows religious
organizations to avoid federal anti-discrimination laws.”31 The ministerial exception is justified by the Supreme Court’s historical reluctance to intervene in the internal matters of the Church. The Founding
Fathers sought to preclude the United States from forming a national
church, something they were familiar with from their experiences with
the Church of England.32 The First Amendment was adopted based
on this skepticism towards state religion.33 Given the understanding
that religion should be free from governmental interference, it was not
until 1952, in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church, that the Supreme Court officially recognized that churches
had the freedom to select their clergy members.34
The first appearance of a ministerial exception was established in
McClure v. Salvation Army in 1972.35 In that case, Billie McClure was
a minister at the Salvation Army, a church.36 She was terminated from
her position and subsequently brought suit against the Salvation Army
contending that the Church had engaged in discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII.37 In deciding the case, the
Fifth Circuit paid particular attention to the special relationship be29. Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 22, 2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-religious-discrimination-workplace#:~:text=religious%20Organization%20Exception%3A
%20Under%20Title%20VII%2C%20religious%20organizations,institutions%20whose%20%E
2%80%9Cpurpose%20and%20character%20are%20primarily%20religious.%E2%80%9D.
30. Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54
VAND. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001).
31. The U.S. Supreme Court Expands the Ministerial Exception, JDSUPRA (July 15, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-u-s-supreme-court-expands-the-96963/.
32. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n., 565 U.S. 171, 183 (2012).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 185–86.
35. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 554.
37. Id. at 555.
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tween a church and its minister.38 The Fifth Circuit referred to the
relationship between a church and its minister as its “lifeblood.”39 Because a court would have to investigate matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance” in Title VII cases between a church and its minister, the State
could easily intrude on matters of the Church.40 The Fifth Circuit
stated that applying the Title VII provisions to relationships between
a church and its minister “would result in an encroachment by the
State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter
by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”41 After McClure, every circuit recognized a ministerial exception barring judicial inquiry into the employment decisions of religious
organizations; however, a case involving the ministerial exception did
not reach the Supreme Court until 2012 when the Court decided Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.42
Hosana-Tabor was a unanimous decision in which the Supreme
Court recognized that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
prohibited certain employment discrimination claims from being
brought against religious organizations.43 Hosanna-Tabor was a member of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.44 Their teachers were divided into two categories: “called and lay.”45 “Called teachers are
regarded as having been called to their vocation by God through a
congregation.”46 To become a “called teacher,” candidates had to satisfy specific academic requirements.47 On completion of these requirements, teachers could be extended the opportunity to be “called.”48
“Called” teachers were then given the title “Minister of Religion,
Commissioned.”49 The Respondent in Hosanna-Tabor was Cheryl
Perich.50 Perich was employed as a teacher at the school and, after
38. See id. at 559.
39. Id. at 558.
40. Id. at 560 (Here, the Court meant “ecclesiastical cognizance” issues that involved a
Church and its clergy. By adjudicating these issues, the Court would have to make decisions
based on or about religion.).
41. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
42. John R. Vile, Ministerial Exception, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https:/
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1461/ministerial-exception (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
43. See generally id.
44. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 177 (2012).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 177.
49. Id.
50. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 556 U.S. at 178.
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completing the requirements, was asked to be a “called” teacher.51 In
June 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy.52 She was placed on
disability leave for the 2004 to 2005 school year.53 When Perich indicated that she was able to return to teaching, issues arose.54 The
school principal expressed concerns about Perich returning and
alerted Perich that the school had already found a replacement for her
for the rest of the year.55 Hosanna-Tabor held a congregation meeting
where the congregation voted to release Perich from her position.56
When Perich refused to resign, Hosanna-Tabor notified Perich that
the congregation was terminating her.57
Perich alleged that her termination violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 and brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor.58 In
defense, Hosanna-Tabor argued that the suit was “barred by the First
Amendment because the claims at issue concerned the employment
relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers.”59
The Supreme Court’s decision formally recognized the “ministerial
exception.”60 The Court stated that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the
government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to
fire one of its ministers.”61 Further, the Court reasoned that precedent
prohibited the government from being involved in “a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”62 In defining the ministerial
exception, the Court noted:
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a
mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments. According to the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement
in such ecclesiastical decisions.63
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 565 U.S. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 181.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 565 U.S. at 182.
Id. at 188–89 (emphasis added).
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Further, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the ministerial exception went beyond the “head of a religious congregation.”64 The
Court stated that “the formal title given [to] Perich by the Church, the
substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the Church” indicated
that Perich was a minister and thus was covered by the “ministerial
exception.”65 As a result, Hosanna-Tabor could not be liable to Perich
for termination based on discrimination.66
While the Supreme Court stated that the ministerial exception applied to Perich, it refused to adopt “a rigid formula for deciding when
an employee qualifies as a minister.”67 However, the court did express
an intention to limit the scope of the exception, noting that it only
applied to employment discrimination claims and expressing “no view
on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions
by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers.”68
D. Post-Hosanna-Tabor
Because of the Supreme Court’s refusal to state a formula for defining a minister, the main question that arose post-Hosanna-Tabor was
how courts would define the position of minister.69 The question was
resolved in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.70 The
case combined two employment disputes involving religious schools.71
The first case involved Agnes Morrissey-Berru, a fifth and sixth
grade teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, a Roman Catholic
primary school.72 Morrissey-Berru taught all subjects, including religion.73 Each year, teachers entered into employment agreements with
Our Lady of Guadalupe School.74 These agreements “made clear that
teachers were expected to ‘model and promote’ Catholic ‘faith and
64. Id. at 190.
65. Id. at 192.
66. Id. at 196.
67. Id. at 190.
68. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 565 U.S. at 196.
69. Leslie C. Griffin, Divining the Scope of the Ministerial Exception, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 1,
2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/
2013_vol_39/january_2013_no_2_religious_freedom/divining_the_scope_of_the_ministerial_exception/.
70. See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
71. Id. at 2055.
72. Id. at 2056.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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morals.’”75 The agreements also stated that teachers could be terminated for failing to adhere to these principles or for conduct that discredits the Roman Catholic Church.76
Morrissey-Berru prepared her students for religious service, prayed
with her students, and taught them religious doctrine.77 During the
2014 school year, the school asked Morrissey-Berru to switch from
full-time to part-time; the following year, the school declined to renew
her contract.78 Subsequently, Morrissey-Berru sued the school for age
discrimination alleging that it wanted to replace her with a younger
teacher.79
The second dispute involved Kristen Biel who worked as a teacher
at St. James School, a Catholic primary school.80 Biel’s employment
agreement “required teachers to serve [their] mission; imposed commitments regarding religious instruction, worship, and personal modeling of the faith; and explained that teachers’ performance would be
reviewed on those bases.”81
Biel taught her students religion and the tenets of the Catholic
Church.82 After a year at the school, St. James did not renew Biel’s
contract.83 Biel alleged that her contract was not renewed because she
“requested a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer.”84 In response, St. James stated that Biel’s contract was not renewed due to poor performance.85
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, opined that the title of minister is not enough to trigger, nor is it a necessary requirement, for the
ministerial exception to apply.86 Rather, the main inquiry for a court
is: what does the employee do?87 In analyzing this question, the Court
concluded that “[w]hen a school with a religious mission entrusts a
teacher with the responsibility of education and forming students in
the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and
the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2056.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2057.
Id.
Id. at 2057–58.
Id. at 2058.
Id.
Id.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2059.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2063–64.
Id. at 2064.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL105.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 9

11-FEB-22

MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

14:00

149

Amendment does not allow.”88 Thus, because Morrissey-Berru and
Biel were entrusted with carrying out the mission of the Catholic
Church, educating and praying with their students, and guiding their
students in the Catholic faith, both teachers fell within the ministerial
exception.89 The fact that they were not given the title “minister” and
that they had less formal religious training was not controlling.90 Their
responsibilities demonstrated that they were essentially religion teachers.91 However, despite expanding the application of the ministerial
exception to teachers, the majority still refused to adopt a rigid
formula that courts could use to decide if an employee falls within the
exception.92
E. Emerging Circuit Split Over the Reach of the Ministerial
Exception
Following Morrissey-Berru, courts are left to decide how HosannaTabor applies to situations outside of employment discrimination.93
One issue that courts have grappled with is whether the ministerial
exception bars religious institutions from workplace harassment
claims, setting up an emerging circuit split.94
1. Elvig Leaves the Door Open
Before the Supreme Court reached its decision in Hosanna-Tabor,
insulating religious employers from Title VII claims over employment
discrimination, circuits dealt with the ministerial exception on their
own.
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the issue in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church.95 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was based on its earlier
decision in Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus.96
Bollard involved a man training to become a priest in the Jesuit Order.97 Bollard claimed that his superiors were sending him sexually
88. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069.
89. Id. at 2066.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2067.
93. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
94. Jon Steingart, Bullied Gay Worker Can Sue Catholic Church 7th Circ. Says, LAW360 (Sept.
1, 2020, 7:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1306084/bullied-gayworker-can-sue-catholic-church-7th-circ-says.
95. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 956.
97. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL105.txt

150

unknown

Seq: 10

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

11-FEB-22

14:00

[Vol. 71:141

explicit messages and texts.98 When Bollard brought suit for sexual
harassment, the Jesuits argued that it should be barred under the ministerial exception.99 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and concluded that there was neither Free Exercise nor Establishment Clause
issues present in the case.100
First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Jesuits did not offer a religious justification for the alleged harassment, thus, their argument
did not involve any religious doctrine.101 Therefore, Bollard’s claim
did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause.102
Second, the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s Lemon Test
to analyze whether Bollard’s claim implicated the Establishment
Clause.103 The Lemon Test was formed in an Establishment Clause
case, Lemon v. Kurtzman.104 The Lemon Test has three parts: “[f]irst,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.”105 The Lemon Test prong that Bollard implicated was
the “excessive government entanglement” prong.106 The Bollard court
divided entanglement into two types: substantive and procedural.107
Procedural entanglement involves suits between a religious institution
and the government.108 Since Bollard’s suit only involved “secular inquires,” the procedural entanglement was “no greater than that attendant on any other civil suit a private litigant might pursue against a
church.”109 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Bollard’s suit did
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.110
The decision in Bollard was a departure from the original line of
thinking regarding the ministerial exception.111 The decision is particularly important because “the original understanding of the ministerial exception was that it provided a safe haven from state regulation
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 947.
102. Id. at 948.
103. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 2004).
109. Id.; Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950.
110. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 150.
111. Coon, supra note 30, at 537–38.
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for all matters involving the relationship between a church and its
ministers.”112
In Elvig, Monica Elvig, an ordained minister, served as an Associate
Pastor at Calvin Presbyterian Church.113 After taking her position, the
Church’s pastor began sexually harassing and intimidating Elvig, creating a hostile work environment.114 She subsequently informed the
Church of the harassment; however, the Church took no action to address the issue.115 Instead, the Church’s pastor retaliated against Elvig
by verbally abusing her and taking away her duties.116 Elvig then filed
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Church voted to
terminate her shortly after.117 Elvig proceeded to file another charge
of sexual harassment, as well as hostile work environment and unlawful retaliation.118
In Elvig, the Ninth Circuit continued its line of thinking from Bollard.119 Elvig states that sexual harassment is not a protected employment decision.120 Thus, Elvig’s harassment claim could proceed
without triggering the ministerial exception.121 The harassment aspect
of Elvig’s claim would only require a secular inquiry, not an inquiry
into the Church’s religious doctrine.122 However, since Elvig alleged
tangible employment decisions which are protected by the ministerial
exception, such as her suspension and subsequent termination, her
claim also implicated the First Amendment.123 Thus, the harassment
aspect of her claim had to be separated from the tangible employment
decision aspect.124 In justifying this separation, the Ninth Circuit
clearly articulated why the ministerial exception should not apply to
Title VII harassment claims:
If we were to ignore Bollard and adopt a rule that the First Amendment bars Elvig from even stating a Title VII claim—out of speculation that that the affirmative defense might somehow involve some
doctrinal component—we would be affording blanket First Amend112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 538.
Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953.
Id.
Id. at 953–54.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 954.
Id.
See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 955–56.
Id. at 962.
Id.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 964.
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ment protection to churches that unreasonably fail to address clear
instances of sexual harassment.125

However, despite the Ninth Circuit’s willingness to allow Elvig’s
harassment claim to move forward, the court created a concerning
loophole which would allow religious organizations to invoke doctrinal defenses to harassment claims. The court noted that if a hostile
work environment claim or workplace harassment claim is brought
against a religious institution, the religious institution can invoke the
ministerial exception and argue that the alleged harassment is in fact a
part of the Church’s doctrine.126 While Calvin Presbyterian Church
did not allege that the harassment was justified based on their religious beliefs, the loophole nevertheless opened the door for other religious institutions to use this defense.127 Thus, there may be room for
the ministerial exception in harassment cases but the Ninth Circuit did
not “interpret it as a complete barrier to claims” by ministerial
employees.128
2. The Tenth Circuit Splits from the Ninth Circuit
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit addressed a case similar to Elvig in
Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese.129 In that case, Monica
Skrzypczak worked as the director of the Department of Religious
Formation for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa.130 Although
Skrzypczak received positive performance reviews during her time at
the Diocese, she was terminated from her position after eleven
years.131 Skrzypczak sued, bringing claims under Title VII for gender
and age discrimination and hostile work environment.132 The Diocese
responded by invoking the ministerial exception.133
The Tenth Circuit found that Skrzypczak was a minister because
some of her duties, despite being purely administrative, furthered the
core mission of the Diocese.134 Skrzypczak argued that her claims of
125. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 964.
126. See id. at 963.
127. Id.
128. Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for the Supreme Court to Carefully Examine the
“Ministerial Exception,” Which Allows Religious Employers to Discriminate in Hiring, FINDLAW
(July 22, 2010), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-time-has-come-for-the-supreme-court-to-carefully-examine-the-ministerial-exception-which-allows-religious-employersto-discriminate-in-hiring.html.
129. Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2010).
130. Id. at 1240.
131. Id. at 1240–41.
132. Id. at 1241.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1243.
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hostile work environment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not protected by the ministerial exception because they did
not involve employment discrimination.135 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, stating that allowing this kind of claim would “involve
gross substantive and procedural entanglement with the Church’s core
functions, its polity, and its autonomy.”136 The Tenth Circuit then announced that hostile work environment claims are barred by the ministerial exception.137 Thus, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.138
3. The Seventh Circuit Joins the Split
The Seventh Circuit joined the fray over whether workplace harassment claims are barred by the ministerial exception with its decision in
Demkovich.139 Sandor Demkovich was the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Church.140 He was fired after two years of employment.141 Demkovich was gay and had been with his partner for over a
decade.142 Demkovich was also overweight and suffered from diabetes
and metabolic syndrome.143 At the time of his hiring, the Church was
aware of his sexual orientation and health.144 Reverend Dada,
Demkovich’s supervisor, subjected Demkovich to hostile comments
about his sexual orientation and repeatedly harassed him about his
weight and medical issues.145 After Demkovich married his partner,
Reverend Dada demanded his resignation, which Demkovich refused,
resulting in his termination.146 Demkovich sued St. Andrew the Apostle Parish on hostile work environment claims.147
In its original decision, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether some
types of claims are exempt from the ministerial exception and thus
permissible under the First Amendment.148 The Seventh Circuit took
the position that the ministerial exception ensures that religious orga135. Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1244.
136. Id. at 1245 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 976 (9th Cir.
2004) (Trott, J., dissenting)).
137. Id. at 1246.
138. Id. at 1245.
139. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 736 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
140. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 721.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 721.
146. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 721.
147. Id. at 723.
148. Id. at 724.
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nizations can “select and control” who their ministers are; therefore,
the exception applies to all employment actions surrounding hiring,
firing, promoting, retiring, and transferring decisions.149 In the Seventh Circuit’s view, hostile work environment claims can be separated
from claims about “select[ion] and control.”150 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that under Hosanna-Tabor, “[s]upervisors within religious
organizations have no constitutionally protected individual rights . . .
to abuse those employees they manage, whether or not they are motivated by their personal religious beliefs.”151
However, the Seventh Circuit vacated its opinion on December 9,
2020, and granted a rehearing en banc.152 The case was reargued on
February 9, 2021, and was eventually decided on July 9, 2021.153 Upon
the rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed its original decision and held that the ministerial exception barred Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims.154 The Seventh Circuit stated that
“precluding hostile work environment claims arising from ministeron-minister harassment also fits within the doctrinal framework of the
ministerial exception.”155 In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the point
of the ministerial exception is to prevent litigation from deciding
“where a minister’s supervisory power over another minister ends and
where employment discrimination law begins.”156 If Demkovich was
allowed to sue his employer, the court would interfere with the Free
Exercise Clause, because the court would be “probing the ministerial
work environment.”157 This would run afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause because the Clause “protects a religious group’s right to shape
its own faith and mission.”158
The Seventh Circuit also said that adjudicating hostile work environment claims by ministers would violate the Establishment
Clause.159 Further, the Seventh Circuit stated that the courts would
become too entangled in the relationship between ministers if hostile
149. Id. at 727.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 730.
152. Daniel Wiessner, In Brief: Full 7th Circuit will review scope of Title VII religious exemption, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/employment-religious/inbrief-full-7th-circuit-will-review-scope-of-title-vii-religious-exemption-idUSL1N2IP3CW.
153. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3. F.4th 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2021).
154. Id. at 985.
155. Id. at 979.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 980.
158. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012)).
159. Demkovich, 3. F.4th at 980.
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work environment claims were allowed.160 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit reversed its prior decision and held that “adjudicating a minister’s hostile work environment claims based on interactions between
ministers would undermine this constitutionally protected
relationship.”161
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru expanded the
scope of the ministerial exception in relation to employment discrimination claims.162 While there were differing opinions on whether the
Court reached the right outcome, not all were surprised by it.163 Most
courts have generally resisted deciding ecclesiastical questions for
churches.164 While churches are not exempt from federal employment
discrimination laws brought by their non-ministerial employees, the
decision in Morrisey-Berru allowed for an expansion of employees
who can be considered ministers for the purpose of the ministerial
exception.165 Since Morrisey-Berru, the Supreme Court has been silent on other ministerial exception issues, leaving the lower courts to
interpret how far to extend the exception.
III. ANALYSIS

OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS

This Part analyzes the circuit court decisions surrounding the ministerial exception and workplace harassment claims. Part III argues that
the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Skrzypczak is incorrect and should be
disregarded moving forward. Further, this Part explains why the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Elvig was correct, albeit confusing. Finally, this
Part examines the Seventh Circuit’s original decision in Demkovich,
before it was vacated, and argues that courts should follow this line of
reasoning moving forward.
A. The Tenth Circuit Got It Wrong
The first instinct of any court is to not involve itself in matters regarding religion.166 This notion was reflected by the Tenth Circuit’s
160. Id. at 981.
161. Id. at 985.
162. Thomas Johnson II & Tanya Warnke, The U.S. Supreme Court Expands the Ministerial
Exception, JDSUPRA (July 15, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-u-s-supremecourt-expands-the-96963/#:~:text=ON%20July%208%2C%202020%2C%20in,avoid%20federal
%20anti%2Ddiscrimination%20laws.
163. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1267–68 (2017).
164. Id. at 1291.
165. See Waters, supra note 2, at 58, 76–77; Johnson & Warnke, supra note 162.
166. Coon, supra note 30, at 483–84.
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decision in Skrzypczak.167 In Skrzypczak, the Tenth Circuit categorically refused to allow ministerial employees to file any Title VII claims
against their religious employer.168 To the Tenth Circuit, the risk of
procedural and substantive entanglement with the “Church’s core
functions” if a hostile work environment claim were allowed to proceed was too great.169 The Tenth Circuit harshly criticized the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Elvig, calling it an “arbitrary and confusing application” of the ministerial exception.170 Admittedly, the decision in
Elvig, while correct, was confusing and complicated.171 However, with
the original decision in Demkovich, concerns about a confusing application of the ministerial exception should be placated.172
The Tenth Circuit did not thoroughly analyze why the ministerial
exception should apply to workplace harassment claims.173 Stating
that excessive entanglement will occur if courts allow workplace harassment claims to proceed, without demonstrating what that entanglement would be, renders its argument invalid.174 While it may not be
the easiest or the most comfortable decision to make, courts must be
able to look at these cases as if the supervisor is not a part of the
religious institution and the case does not involve any trace of religion.175 As demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit, it is possible to separate the unlawful activity of workplace harassment from the religion
itself.176
By separating hostile work environment and workplace harassment
from tangible employment actions that implicate religious doctrine,
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues can be avoided. If the
claims cannot be separated, courts can simply handle those claims as
they arise.177 The Seventh Circuit in the original Demkovich decision
167. Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010).
168. Id. at 1246.
169. Id. at 1245.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1244–45.
172. Compare Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 738 (7th. Cir. 2020),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir.
2021), with Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church 375 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2004).
173. See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010).
174. Id. at 1245.
175. See Ira C. Lupu & Roger W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy and Congregations: Disputes Between
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 157 (2009) (“If both act
and injury can be separated from the religious body’s evaluative process, then and only to that
extent, the defamation claim should be justiciable.”).
176. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 734–35.
177. Id. at 735 (“We believe that risk can be managed by avoiding substantive decisions on
issues of religious doctrine or belief and by balancing First Amendment rights with the em-
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demonstrated the way that courts should handle a workplace harassment claim against a religious employer.178
It is alarming that the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Bollard and Elvig
give religious institutions the option to argue that harassment is a part
of their doctrine, thus bringing the harassment within the purview of
the ministerial exception.179 However, there is no evidence suggesting
that this tactic will prevail.180 The Seventh Circuit originally demonstrated this through the dismissal of the defense’s claim that the harassment Demkovich experienced was motivated by Catholic
doctrine.181 If churches do invoke this defense, then courts will encounter a First Amendment issue because previous Supreme Court
decisions have held that it is improper for courts to question the
“truthfulness or validity of religious beliefs.”182 Therefore, a court will
not be able to reject an argument by a religious institution that harassment is a part of its religious doctrine if the religious institution sincerely believes it is a part of its doctrine.
The best way to prevent this is to preclude religious institutions
from claiming harassment is a part of their religious doctrine. Preventing ministerial employees from filing federal claims against their religious employers signals that their employers are above the law and
demonstrates that the government is not willing to support ministerial
employees.183 As Professor Robin West puts it, one would think that
“because of their institutional role as moral leaders in civil society,
[religious employers] should abide by public and private obligations of
fairness.”184
B. Harassment as a Religious Doctrine?
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in Elvig that Title VII harassment claims against religious institutions should move forward so long
ployee’s rights and the government’s interest in regulating employment discrimination. We trust
that district courts will manage these issues in their sound discretion.”).
178. Id.
179. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2004).
180. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 734–35.
181. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963; Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 734–35.
182. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Emp’t Div.,
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990)).
183. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo Meets the Ministerial Exception:
Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. &
MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 249 (2019) (“The sexual harassment carve-out from the
ministerial exception has at its base the principle that religious entities, like all other employers,
must protect their employees from certain kinds of indignity and disrespect.”). Id. at 300.
184. Robin West, Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social
Contract, SCHOLARSHIP AT GEO. 1, 4 (2015).
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as they do not implicate protected ministerial decisions.185 The ministerial exception was created to protect religious organizations from
“constitutionally impermissible interference by the government.”186
However, Congress has a “fully applicable command ‘to protect employees from sex discrimination—even employees of religious organizations.’”187 By separating the harassment from tangible employment
decisions, the Ninth Circuit struck the right balance between the First
Amendment rights of religious institutions and the rights of employees to recover against their employer.188 In fact, tangible employment
decisions will not be involved at all in the inquiry because the only
focus will be on a minister’s decision to harass an employee.189 By
limiting the focus of the inquiry to harassment, religious institutions
are given sufficient protection from the government intruding into
their religious practices and decisions.190 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the correct move forward because it protects religious employees’ right to recover for harassment while maintaining separation
between church and state.191
While the final decision by the Ninth Circuit in Elvig is correct, its
most controversial aspect was the court’s view that religious institutions can assert that harassment is a part of their religious teaching.192
Professor Caroline Corbin presents an interesting argument to refute
this position.193 Professor Corbin argues that when religious organizations discriminate based on their religious doctrine, religious questions
are not implicated.194 This is because the religious institutions will
have already articulated their religious doctrine when they present
their defense.195 Thus, Title VII cases can proceed while “deferring
185. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 969.
186. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999).
187. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 956 (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944).
188. Id. at 960.
189. Id. at 963.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 969.
192. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 278; Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963.
193. Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2014 (2007).
194. Id.
195. Id. Professor Corbin further explained this theory as follows:
If the risk posed by a Title VII claim is that judging whether an employment decision
was based on race or sex rather than true qualifications will require a court to determine a religious organization’s tenets and who best embodies them, that risk disappears
where the religious organization admits that sex or race played a role. For example, if a
religious organization states that according to its tenets, married men are the head of
household and therefore are paid more than married women, it has conceded
discrimination.
Id.
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completely to the religious organization on doctrinal questions.”196
For example, in Elvig’s case, Calvin Presbyterian would have to admit
that its religious doctrine permits harassment based on sex; thus, there
would be no need to actually inquire into Calvin Presbyterian’s
doctrine.197
Although the argument seems contradictory, it demonstrates that
the Ninth Circuit’s statement regarding a possible doctrinal defense to
workplace harassment claims is flawed.198 Although the Ninth Circuit
came to the correct decision, a much clearer and succinct articulation
of the idea that Title VII workplace harassment claims should not be
barred by the ministerial exception was detailed in the Seventh Circuit’s original Demkovich decision.199
C. Demkovich Had It Right the First Time
The Seventh Circuit’s original line of thinking in its first decision in
Demkovich provides clearer guidance for courts to address claims of
hostile work environment and workplace harassment against religious
institutions.200 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the uncomfortable
situation that courts deciding these types of cases face. Longstanding
legal norms provide that courts should not decide ecclesiastical decisions, and there is no evidence suggesting that courts will stray from
this standard.201 However, workplace harassment and hostile work environment claims have nothing to do with ecclesiastical decisions because they are not “tangible employment actions,” rather they are
claims that fall outside of what is necessary to properly control and
supervise ministerial employees.202
The Seventh Circuit had the difficult task of deciding the broad and
consequential question of: “whether ministerial employee plaintiffs
may ever bring hostile environment claims against religious employers.”203 In any case involving the government and a religious institution, neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clause can be
violated.204 The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor stated that the
196. Id.
197. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2004).
198. Id.
199. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2020),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir.
2021).
200. See generally Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 722–23.
201. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 1278.
202. Demkovich, 973 F.3d 718 at 723.
203. Id.
204. First Amendment and Religion, supra note 11.
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ministerial exception is needed to protect the Church’s right to free
exercise and also to prevent excessive entanglement that would violate the Establishment Clause.205 The Seventh Circuit took each
clause separately and explained why allowing ministerial employees to
sue would not violate either of the Religion Clauses.206
Under the Free Exercise Clause, the main issue is whether the harassment is a tangible employment action.207 Hosanna-Tabor ensured
that religious institutions could “select and control” their ministerial
employees.208 As the Seventh Circuit concluded, defining the meaning
of “selection” is easy; it simply means to hire or fire an employee.209 It
is also not hard to discern the meaning of the issue of control. The
ability to control one’s employees can be accomplished through benefits, compensation, and training—all tangible employment actions.210
Selection and control of employees does not include making degrading remarks or creating a hostile work environment.211 However,
Saint Andrew the Apostle Parish argued that the power given to them
by Hosanna-Tabor was not enough to effectively control or select
their ministers.212 In its original judgment, the Seventh Circuit swiftly
and correctly struck down this argument.213 However, on rehearing en
banc, the Seventh Circuit equated harassment of a ministerial employee to supervision of a ministerial employee.214 This is a disturbing
revocation of its past decision stating that there was not a tangible
employment issue at stake regarding hostile work environment
claims.215
There is no valid reason for employers to harass employees to get
them to quit or to further control them because religious employers
already have the ability to hire or fire employees based on their sexual
orientation.216 For example, if Saint Andrew the Apostle Parish had a
205. Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012).
206. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 727–34.
207. Id. at 727.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 728–29.
212. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 728.
213. Id. at 729.
214. Demkovich v. St. Andrew Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2021).
215. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), and
Demkovich v. St. Andrew Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968. (7th Cir. 2021).
216. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 729; e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 292. The Seventh
Circuit originally articulated this by stating the following:
Because Demkovich was a ministerial employee, Dada could have lawfully dismissed
Demkovich as soon as Dada learned of the employee’s plan to marry a same sex part-

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL105.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 21

MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

11-FEB-22

14:00

161

problem with Demkovich’s sexuality, then there was nothing precluding it from terminating his employment.217 As the Seventh Circuit
originally stated, “[i]t is hard to see how the Church could not have
adequately controlled plaintiff as a ministerial employee by deciding
whether to hire him and whether to fire him, or by deciding his job
duties . . . and so forth.”218
The issue of excessive entanglement is arguably the hardest to reconcile.219 As previously discussed in Elvig, two types of entanglement
must be dealt with: procedural and substantive.220 There is a chance
that procedural entanglement can arise during a workplace harassment case involving a religious institution.221 However, the risk of procedural entanglement does not support an outright ban on all hostile
environment claims.222 The Seventh Circuit originally suggested that
courts are capable of dealing with procedural entanglement as it
arises.223
The more complicated of the two entanglement issues is substantive
entanglement.224 Substantive entanglement entails civil courts deciding cases that involve religious institutions while applying neutral, secular principles of law.225 Courts must avoid questioning religious
doctrines.226 The Seventh Circuit acknowledges the potential existence of substantive entanglement in future ministerial exception and
workplace harassment cases.227 However, the Seventh Circuit originally found that the risk posed by the entanglement was not excessive
in Demkovich.228 The harassment that Demkovich experienced was
considered abuse under neutral, generally applicable standards which
ner. Alternatively, Dada could have chosen to retain Demkovich as a Music Director
while encouraging him—in a respectful or loving way, rather than a harsh and degrading way—to bring his conduct into conformity with church teaching.
Id.
217. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 734 (“The Church was free to decide whether to retain plaintiff
as a minister or fire him.”).
218. Id. at 729.
219. Id. at 731–32.
220. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2004); Demkovich, 973
F.3d at 732.
221. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 733.
222. Id.
223. Id. (“[T]he potential for procedural entanglement does not bar plaintiff’s claims here
entirely. Courts can deal with procedural entanglement problems as they arise rather than closing the courthouse doors to an entire category of cases.”).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 733.
228. Id. at 734 (“We are not persuaded that the risk of substantive entanglement is so great
that this case or all such cases must be dismissed without further inquiry or discovery.”).
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would apply to non-ministers.229 Courts can deal with the issue of substantive entanglement by balancing the Church’s First Amendment
rights with those of the employee and the interest that the government
has in regulating employment harassment.230
The original Demkovich decision promulgated the notion that both
religious liberty and “the rights of employees to be free from discriminatory hostile work environments” can be protected.231 “The right
balance is to bar claims by ministerial employees challenging tangible
employment actions but to allow hostile environment claims that do
not challenge tangible employment actions.”232 The ministerial exception will still be able to protect churches from being sued as a result of
hiring and firing decisions, but by not extending the exception to these
tortious-like claims, employees can retain protection from harassment.233 In fact, the fear of excessive entanglement and intrusion on
religious liberty may be unfounded.234 The Ninth Circuit has not encountered the issue of entanglement in a single case in the nearly
twenty years after its Elvig decision.235
The Seventh Circuit’s strongest argument in the original decision
was that the tortious nature of workplace harassment made the ministerial exception inapplicable.236 Churches are not allowed to act criminally or tortiously towards their employees, ministerial or not.237
Churches can be, and are, held accountable for torts and breaches of
contract.238 Allowing ministerial employees to bring hostile work
claims against their religious employers would simply be an extension
of an already present legal norm.239 The growing amount of tort litigation against religious institutions signals that the public is sympathetic
229. Id.
230. Id. at 735.
231. Id. at 720 (“[T]he courts have a long history of balancing and compromising to protect
religious freedom while enforcing other important legal rights.”).
232. Id.
233. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 729.
234. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 991 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 286.
238. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir.
1985).
239. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Hosanna-Tabor’s decision not to extend constitutional protection to tortious conduct, in combination with the Court’s understanding of hostile work environments as essentially tortious in
nature, point toward allowing hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees so long
as they do not challenge tangible employment actions.”).
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towards victims of “clergy exploitation.”240 The extensive tort litigation that the Catholic Church has recently faced also demonstrates
that the risk of procedural entanglement can be avoided.241 Secular
legal rules can be applied to actions involving ministerial employees
just as they are applied to everyone else.242 Even Hosanna-Tabor
stated that the specific holding did not cover tortious conduct by religious employers.243 The tort-law origins of harassment claims show a
lack of constitutional necessity for barring ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims.244
While on the surface it may seem like the better option is to file a
tort claim instead of a Title VII discrimination claim, both options
should still be available.245 As published author Sharon Bradford observed, “alternative paths should not be necessary to prove complete
relief to victims” of a hostile workplace and harassment.246 Many employees are given “a right without a remedy” under Title VII.247 The
remedies provided by this right may be further reduced if the employees are in a ministerial position.248 Because of the lack of damage
remedies under Title VII, victims of harassment turn to other sources
of relief; however, they are of “limited and diminishing
availability.”249
The ministerial exception is not a general immunity from civil laws
governing an employer’s relationship with its employees.250 Just because religious employees have one option for redress, it does not
mean that other plausible and possible options should be unavailable.251 To offer the most protection to religious employees, both the
options of suing under Title VII and filing a tort claim must be
available.252
240. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L. J. 219, 242–43 (2000).
241. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 733; see, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430–32 (2d Cir. 1999); see generally Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351–57
& n.2, 7, 10 (Fla. 2002).
242. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 733.
243. Id. at 729.
244. Id. at 728.
245. Bradford, supra note 25, at 1619.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1630.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1617.
250. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 132.
251. Bradford, supra note 25, at 1619.
252. See id. at 1618–19.
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IV. MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES DESERVE PROTECTION
The decision to vacate the original Demkovich decision was particularly disheartening considering that the Seventh Circuit’s original decision provided a perfect line of reasoning that the Supreme Court
could have used in articulating how the ministerial exception does not
apply to workplace harassment claims. There was no need for the Seventh Circuit to abandon its already correctly decided opinion. However, the newest decision reinforces the notion that courts are
extremely reluctant to get involved in issues dealing with religion. The
Seventh Circuit’s newest decision demonstrates the lengths that a
court will go to side with religious institutions, simply to avoid a possible First Amendment issue.
The relationship between church and state has been debated since
the founding of the United States.253 The Catholic Church is allowed
to believe what they would like about same-sex marriage and the
LGBTQ+ community, but they should not be allowed to harass someone they hired. The debate over the extent of government interaction
with religious institutions should be limited to the scope of tangible
employment decisions.254 As the Seventh Circuit stated in its original
judgment, “supervisors within religious organizations have no constitutionally protected individual rights under Hosanna-Tabor to abuse
those employees they manage, whether or not they are motivated by
their personal religious beliefs.”255
Over 200,000 Americans work in religious organizations.256 Many of
those employees fall within the purview of the ministerial exception as
defined in Hosanna-Tabor and more recently, in Morrisey-Berru.257
Nearly one-fifth of American workers find their workplace to be hostile.258 If courts continue to categorically bar hostile environment
claims by ministerial employees, then thousands of ministerial employees will lose federal protection from harms incurred while sup253. Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (“Controversy between church and state over religious offices is hardly new.”).
254. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959–62 (9th Cir. 2004).
255. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 730 (2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
256. Religious Organizations – May 2019 National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/oes/2019/may/naics4_813100.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
257. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–91; Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. MorrisseyBerru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055–64 (2020).
258. One-fifth of Americans Find Workplace Hostile or Threatening, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2017,
6:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/14/one-fifth-of-americans-find-workplace-hostile-orthreatening. html.
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porting religious institutions.259 As the dissent states in the Seventh
Circuit’s most recent decision, “the combination of the majority’s
holding in this case with efforts to expand the categories of employees
deemed ‘ministerial’ threatens to leave many without basic legal protection of their dignity and employment.”260
Religious freedom and lack of government interference will always
remain at the forefront of court decisions involving religious institutions.261 However, churches cannot be above the law.262 The harm
that comes from a hostile work environment outweighs the risk that a
court will interfere with a church’s ecclesiastical decisions.263 Employees who experience a hostile work environment often suffer from depression and nervousness.264 In addition to psychological injuries,
headaches, nausea, and other physical injuries often result from harassment in the workplace.265 For example, a Swedish study found that
workers who experience sexual harassment are at a greater risk of
suicide.266 “American researchers believe that this study underscores
the need to consider workplace sexual harassment as both an occupational hazard and a significant public health problem.”267 The risk of
excessive entanglement is not worth a ministerial employee being
harassed daily, and there is little justification for allowing it under the
First Amendment.268
The ministerial exception was not intended to extend to workplace
harassment claims.269 If this issue reaches the Supreme Court, then
the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning articulated in the Seventh Circuit’s vacated judgment.270 If the Supreme Court chooses to
follow the Tenth Circuit, and not the Seventh Circuit, more ministerial
259. Jamie Manson, After the Supreme Court’s Latest Decision, Who Would Want to Work in a
Church?, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (July 14, 2020), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/gracemargins/after-supreme-courts-latest-decision-who-would-want-work-church.
260. Demkovich v. St. Andrew Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 996 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
261. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 720 (7th. Cir. 2020), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
262. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 723.
263. Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 185–89 (2012).
264. Bradford, supra note 25, at 1615.
265. Id.
266. Bryan E. Robinson, Does Sexual Harassment Raise the Risk of Suicide?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-right-mindset/202011/doessexual-harassment-raise-the-risk-suicide.
267. Id.
268. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 735 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
269. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 730.
270. Id. at 729.
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employees could lose their right to file a federal claim against their
employer because of the decision in Morrisey-Berru.271 Who can qualify as a minister was greatly expanded in Morrissey-Berru.272 As stated
above, “what matters is what an employee does” when discerning
whether an employee is in a ministerial position.273 The decision in
Morrissey-Berru allows more religious employees to be considered
ministers than was previously intended.274 Because non-ministerial
employees of religious institutions are allowed to file workplace harassment claims, religious institutions may be incentivized to claim that
more of their employees are ministers to avoid Title VII claims.275 To
ensure that religious institutions will not abuse an expansion of the
ministerial exception, the Supreme Court must revoke the idea that
the ministerial exception bars workplace harassment claims for
ministers.276
While these religious employees have the ability to sue under a tort
theory, their recovery in tort is insufficient.277 Preventing employees
from filing Title VII claims greatly reduces their chance of a satisfactory recovery.278 In addition, tort theories vary from state to state.279
By forcing religious employees to rely solely on tort theory to recover,
their recovery will be based on the state in which they reside.280 Thus,
religious employees might be at an even greater disadvantage simply
based on the location of their job.281
The law surrounding the intersection of the ministerial exception
and hostile work environment claims falls short.282 Regardless of the
Seventh Circuit’s most recent decision, there is no evidence to suggest
that this issue will be settled anytime soon, setting up another opportunity for the Supreme Court to enter the discussion surrounding the
271. Manson, supra note 259.
272. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066 (2020) (“In a
country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a
complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a
particular role in every religious tradition.”).
273. Id. at 2064.
274. Manson, supra note 259.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Bradford, supra note 25, at 1619.
278. Id. (“Thus, the need to resort to external causes of action contravenes the spirit and goals
of title VII.”).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 183, at 252.
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ministerial exception’s application to hostile workplace and harassment claims.283
V.

CONCLUSION

Hostile work environment claims present “a conflict between two of
the highest values in our society and legal system: religious liberty and
non-discrimination in employment.”284 The ministerial exception protects religious institutions by preventing employment discrimination
suits against religious employers under Title VII.285 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor affirmed that the ministerial exception protects religious institutions from Title VII suits when tangible employment decisions are involved.286 Since its inception, courts
have struggled to cohesively articulate the reach of the ministerial exception.287 The main emerging issue is how the exception will apply to
claims by ministerial employees against their religious employers for
workplace harassment.288
The ministerial exception should not be used to prevent ministerial
employees from suing their religious employers.289 Religious employers should not have a constitutionally protected right to abuse their
employees.290 The Ninth Circuit supports the contention that the ministerial exception does not bar hostile work environment claims.291
However, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Elvig is confusing.292 In order
to prevent confusion in future cases, courts should adopt the Seventh
Circuit’s original analysis in Demkovich.293
283. Patrick Hornbeck, Chicago Archdiocese takes ‘religious liberty’ too far in Demkovich
case, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/chicagoarchdiocese-takes-religious-liberty-too-far-dem kovich-case (“The Supreme Court has not decided whether a religious employer’s immunity when it comes to hiring and firing covers mistreating and harassing employees as well.”).
284. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 996 (7th Cir.
2021).
285. Idleman, supra note 240, at n.119.
286. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
287. Compare Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718, 735 (7th. Cir. 2020),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir.
2021), Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004), and Skrzypczak v.
Roman Catholic, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010).
288. Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245.
289. Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 730.
290. Id.
291. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 969.
292. See Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245 (calling the Tenth Circuit’s application of the ministerial exception “confusing”).
293. See generally Demkovich, 973 F.3d 718.
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Prior to its decision to vacate and grant a rehearing, the Seventh
Circuit had a clearly delineated answer regarding the intersection of
the ministerial exception and workplace harassment.294 Due to the
Seventh Circuit’s newest decision, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elvig
is the only precedent allowing ministerial employees to sue for workplace harassment unless the issue reaches the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the glimmer of hope that the Seventh Circuit’s original
decision gave to ministerial employees has been extinguished with the
Court’s recent decision to vacate. Workers deserve to have protection
from harassment at their job regardless of their employer being a religious institution. A person’s dignity does not disappear when they
become a minister.
Sara Riddick

294. Id. at 735.

